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IMPALED ON MORTON’S FORK:† KOSOVO, CRIMEA, AND 
THE SUI GENERIS CIRCUMSTANCE 
Christopher R. Rossi∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article investigates the problematic invocation of unique 
circumstances as a justification for circumventing international law relating to 
the use of force and state secession. Borrowing from the teachings of critical 
sociology, this Article addresses the lessons learned from NATO’s 1999 
intervention in Kosovo and Kosovo’s 2008 Declaration of Independence from 
Serbia; it adapts those teachings to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. 
Doctrinal, state-sponsored, and international juridical attempts to conform the 
Kosovo events to the international rule of law mask internal and unreconciled 
tensions within the United Nations Charter system. These tensions, which 
threaten to further weaken the system and expose it to dangerous 
manipulations, have upset international law’s delicate balance between 
respect for territorial integrity and the right of self-determination. These 
weaknesses also help explain why two of the most significant doctrinal 
developments to emerge from the mist of Kosovo—the Responsibility to Protect 
and remedial secession—have retreated from earlier enthusiastic assessments 
of their prospects in international law. Embedded in the recourse to the sui 
generis claim is the cautionary belief that its invocation may likely mask extra-
legal intentions as support for international law’s progressive development. 
  
 
 † Morton’s Fork is the logical dilemma of choosing between equally undesirable options. Morton’s 
Fork, OXFORD DICTIONARIES ONLINE (2015). 
 ∗ Adjunct Faculty Member, University of Iowa College of Law; Ph.D. and M.A., Johns Hopkins 
University (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies); LL.M., University of London; J.D., 
University of Iowa; B.A., Washington University in St. Louis. The author thanks Nick Onuf and Nathaniel 
Beal for helpful comments and librarian John Bergstrom for research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, NATO launched a successful seventy-eight day bombing 
campaign against Serbia in its southern province of Kosovo.1 The purpose of 
the campaign was to halt human rights violations given imminent concerns of 
ethnic cleansing against Kosovar Albanians.2 NATO initiated the war without 
seeking United Nations (U.N.) Security Council authorization,3 which violated 
the U.N. Charter. Chapter VII of the Charter grants the Security Council a 
monopoly on the use of force save for individual or collective self-defense.4 
But Security Council action seemed futile because Russia likely would have 
vetoed any forceful initiative against its close ally, Yugoslavia.5 The Security 
Council addressed the situation in Kosovo through resolutions that attempted 
to end hostilities prior to the intervention, but none of them authorized the use 
of force.6 At the conclusion of hostilities, the Security Council established the 
U.N. Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).7 This resolution, Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999), was cited as paving the way for Kosovo to 
become an independent state,8 but it in fact advocated a “political solution,” 
“reaffirm[ed] the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and 
 
 1 The NATO air campaign took place from March 24-June 10, 1999. See THE INDEPENDENT INT’L 
COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 92 
(2000) [hereinafter KOSOVO REPORT].  
 2 See Press Release, Secretary-General of NATO, Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana (Mar. 23, 1999), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm [hereinafter Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana]; see also 
Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General [Annan] Calls for Renewed Commitment in New Century 
to Protect Rights of Man, Woman, Child—Regardless of Ethnic, National Belonging, U.N. Press Release 
SG/SM 6949 HR/CN/898 (Apr. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Press Release by Secretary-General Annan], http:// 
www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990407.sgsm6949.html (noting the “dark cloud of the crime of genocide” may 
be “happening once more, in Kosovo”). 
 3 See CIARÁN BURKE, AN EQUITABLE FRAMEWORK FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 1 (2013). 
 4 See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. 
 5 See BURKE, supra note 3. 
 6 See S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 10, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); 
S.C. Res. 1239 (May 14, 1999); see also Ilan Fuchs & Harry Borowski, The New World Order: Humanitarian 
Interventions from Kosovo to Libya and Perhaps Syria?, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 304, 305–06 (2015) (“[N]o 
specific Security Council Resolution explicitly authorized the use of force.”). 
 7 S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999). 
 8 See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Verbatim Record, I.C.J., CR 2009/30, at 28, ¶ 16 
(Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15726.pdf (“The simple fact is that resolution 1244 
works. Without preordaining, it permitted Kosovo’s independence.”); see also James Ker-Lindsay, Preventing 
the Emergence of Self-Determination as a Norm of Secession: An Assessment of the Kosovo ‘Unique Case’ 
Argument, 65 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 837, 844 (2013) [hereinafter Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-
Determination]. 
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territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,”9 and “did not 
contain any provision dealing with the final status of Kosovo or with the 
conditions for its achievement.”10 
NATO’s decision to bypass the Charter’s jus ad bellum regime, the law 
governing the initiation of force, complicated the legitimacy of the mission and 
challenged the efficacy of international law.11 International law’s respect for 
territorial integrity prohibits military action by one state against another, except 
in self-defense.12 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not attacked a 
fellow U.N. member state or a NATO member state; and indeed, Kosovo had 
belonged to Serbia.13 In addition to violating the Charter, the air strikes 
violated a general principle of law dating back to Roman law—the same 
principle NATO purported to uphold in its actions against Yugoslavia14—legal 
rights cannot arise from unlawful acts (ex injuria jus non oritur).15 
To justify its acts, NATO floated trial balloons. Official statements linked 
NATO actions to the intentions behind the Security Council Resolutions and 
 
 9 S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 7, pmbl. The International Court of Justice recalled Resolution 1244’s tenth 
preambular paragraph on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in its 2010 
advisory opinion on Kosovo. See Accordance with the International Law of Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 96 (July 22) [hereinafter 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo]. The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo opined that:  
The Court thus concludes that the object and purpose of resolution 1244 (1999) was to establish a 
temporary, exceptional legal régime which, save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, 
superseded that Serbian legal order and which aimed at the stabilization of Kosovo, and that it 
was designed to do so on an interim basis.  
Id. ¶ 100. 
 10 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 9, ¶ 114. 
 11 See DANILO ZOLO, INVOKING HUMANITY: WAR, LAW AND GLOBAL ORDER 72 (2002). 
 12 See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51. 
 13 According to NATO’s constitutive document, the North Atlantic Treaty [Washington Treaty], Articles 
5 and 6(1) require that an armed attack against one or more of the parties be considered an attack against them 
all. The North Atlantic Treaty arts. 5, 6(1), Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; see also Fuchs & 
Burowski, supra note 6, at 305–06.  
 14 See Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana, supra note 2 (noting the need to stop the Yugoslav 
Government’s repression of its people); see also President Clinton, Statement on Kosovo, Address at the 
University of Virginia Miller Center (Mar. 24, 1999), http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3932 
(noting attacks against civilians and Serbia’s military build-up of 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo during 
the Rambouillet negotiations were “in clear violation of the commitments they had made”). 
 15 See generally Christopher R. Rossi, Ex Injuria Jus Non Oritur, Ex Factis Jus Oritur, and the Elusive 
Search for Equilibrium After Ukraine, 24 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143–73 (2015) [hereinafter Rossi, Ex 
Injuria].  
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the transcendent authority of the international community;16 NATO pledged 
cooperation with international criminal proceedings, underscored the need for 
regional security arrangements, and highlighted violations of international law 
by Yugoslav President Milošević’s regime.17 According to the United States 
(U.S.) Department of State’s acting Legal Adviser, NATO’s justifications were 
“based on the unique combination of a number of factors.”18 
Ian Brownlie and C.J. Apperly wrote that these legal justifications 
contained “eccentricities from the outset,” including an avoidance of legal 
specifics and a notable steering-clear of the familiar but controversial19 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, favoring instead the emotive appeal to 
avoid a “humanitarian catastrophe.”20 Rosalyn Higgins wondered whether 
NATO’s “legal inventiveness” “stretch[ed] too far legal flexibility in the cause 
of good . . . In our unipolar world, does now the very adoption of a resolution 
under Chapter VII of the Charter trigger a legal authorisation to act by NATO 
when it determines it necessary?”21 NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana 
sought to avoid such criticisms with his assurance that NATO was “not waging 
war against Yugoslavia,”22 a point begrudgingly contradicted by NATO’s 
Supreme Commander23 and the tally of ensuing carnage.24 
 
 16 See Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana, supra note 2 (noting the need to stop the Yugoslav 
Government’s repression of its people). 
 17 See Patrick Thornberry, ‘Come, friendly bombs. . .’: International Law in Kosovo, in KOSOVO: THE 
POLITICS OF DELUSION 43, 45 (Michael Waller et al. eds., 2001).  
 18 “These particular factors included: the failure of the FRY to comply with Security Council demands 
under Chapter VII; the danger of a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo; the inability of the Council to make a 
clear decision adequate to deal with that disaster; and the serious threat to peace and security in the region 
posed by Serb actions.” Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo, 94 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 301, 301 (2000). 
 19 See Ian Brownlie & C.J. Apperly, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law 
Aspects, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 878, 886 (2000) (“There is no sufficient evidence of the existence of a legal 
right of States, whether acting individually or jointly, to use force for humanitarian purposes.”). 
 20 Id. at 880; Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana, supra note 2. 
 21 Rosalyn Higgins, International Law in a Changing International System, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 78, 94 
(1999). 
 22 Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana, supra note 2; see also Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian 
War’ over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 102 (1999). 
 23 See Peter J. Boyer, General Clark’s Battles, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2003), http://www.newyorker. 
com/magazine/2003/11/17/general-clarks-battles (quoting retired General Wesley Clark’s Sept. 19, 2003 
remark at the University of Iowa College of Law’s Richard S. Levitt Lecture Series that the Kosovo war was 
“technically illegal”); see also DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LIBERATING KOSOVO: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND US 
INTERVENTION xv (2012) (“We are going to systematically attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate, and, unless 
President Milošević complies with the demands of the international community, we are going to destroy his 
forces with their facilities.” (quoting NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark)).  
 24 The NATO air campaign included 38,400 sorties, 10,484 strikes and 26,614 bombs dropped; over 
ninety percent of the Kosovar Albanian population was displaced; 863,000 civilians fled Kosovo and another 
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Official attempts to quiet concerns of unlawful action were 
“contemporaneously accompanied by a period of stark silence from 
international lawyers concerning the strict legality of the operation.”25 Part of 
this silence reflected uncertainty about formulating a lawful international 
community response beyond the Security Council to aid populations suffering 
from internal atrocities.26 This silence would end with the 2001 introduction of 
a Canadian-sponsored report advocating the international community’s 
“Responsibility to Protect,” an important and evolving norm of disputed 
significance in international law.27 Another part of the silence stemmed from a 
more primordial concern: impaled on Morton’s Fork, international lawyers had 
to choose between ignoring the Charter’s prohibition against using force to 
prevent possible “ethnic cleansing,” or upholding the letter of the law while 
witnessing the wholesale slaughter or displacement of innocents.28 The 
dilemma of choosing between these (equally?) bad alternatives posed a major 
theoretical contradiction for international lawyers. Either choice undercut the 
moral underpinnings of the ex injuria jus non oritur principle and 
problematized the legality of the Kosovo bombardment, spreading doctrinal 
uncertainty. As Patrick Thornberry wrote: “Kosovo is a stop on the voyage to 
somewhere, direction and destination [] still shrouded in mist.”29 Higgins 
forewarned that the “passing outside of the UN altogether” and the extending 
 
590,000 persons were displaced internally. See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 1, at 90, 92. Estimates vary, but 
the American Association of the Advancement of Sciences statisticians estimate 10,500 Kosovar Albanians 
were killed during the bombing campaign. Id. at 306. Widespread atrocities were documented, including rape, 
summary executions on both sides, use of human shields, torture, cruel and inhumane treatment, wanton 
pillaging, and the burning of over 500 villages. See id. Annex 1, 306–11. One report citing Serbian Defense 
Ministry statistics claims 659 Serbian soldiers were killed or missing. See Marija Ristic, Death Toll from 
NATO Yugoslavia Bombing Still Unknown, BALKANINSIGHT (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.balkaninsight.com/ 
en/article/number-of-victims-of-nato-bombing-still-unknown. 
 25 BURKE, supra note 3, at 6 (citations omitted). 
 26 See Gareth Evans, President, Int’l Crisis Grp., Address at the 98th Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law: The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention (Apr. 4, 
2004), http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech103.html (describing the international community and academic 
response to Kosovo and other humanitarian disasters as not confidently handled or helpful).  
 27 See generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. The U.N. Security Council validated 
the concept in 2006. See S.C. Res. 1674 (Apr. 28, 2006). For a discussion on the disputed significance of the 
doctrine, see Christopher R. Rossi, The Responsibility to Protect and the Plenitudinal Mindset of International 
Humanitarian Law, 5 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. 352, 372–77 (2014) [hereinafter Rossi, Responsibility 
to Protect]. 
 28 See Rossi, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 27, at 365. 
 29 See Thornberry, supra note 17, at 44.  
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of powers reserved under the Charter to the Security Council presented 
considerable long-term implications.30 
This Article investigates the doctrinal attempts to reconcile the 
contradictions presented by Kosovo. Western international lawyers attempted 
to square competing concerns about NATO’s intervention by asserting that 
Kosovo was unique, or sui generis (“of its own kind/genus”).31 The same claim 
would be made again to support Kosovo’s unilateral Declaration of 
Independence from Serbia, confounding standard usage by making Kosovo 
doubly unique.32 But the invocation of the sui generis circumstance satisfied 
concerns. It forestalled direct confrontation with the U.N. Charter proscription 
against using force while making an allowance for a circumscribed exception. 
It sustained the liberal international view of the Charter system by normalizing 
international legal disclosure in support of the Charter’s power structure. It 
avoided nettlesome legal questions about the primacy of territorial integrity, 
the primacy of the Charter’s jus ad bellum system, and the relation of both to 
the basic if not burgeoning right of self-determination.33 It seemingly 
supported, at least by inference, a right of remedial secession34 in a historically 
dangerous corner of Europe, notwithstanding Europe’s own determination that 
no such right applied to the autonomous province of Kosovo.35 And, 
 
 30 Higgins, supra note 21, at 94. 
 31 See, e.g., Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the 
Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 41 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004) (noting the 
bombing represented the first time in the Charter’s history that a group of states justified bombing another state 
in the name of protecting minority populations within that state); Roberts, supra note 22 (listing a “unique 
combination of a number of factors”). 
 32 See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Verbatim Record, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 30, ¶ 39 (Dec. 8) 
(“If the Court should find it necessary to examine Kosovo’s Declaration through the lens of self-determination, 
it should consider the unique legal and factual circumstances of this case.”). 
 33 See Rossi, The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 27, at 358–61. 
 34 Remedial secession modifies the prevailing opinion among international legal scholars that there is no 
international legal right to secede except under (1) classical conditions of decolonization, where an overseas 
colony seeks liberation from Metropolitan rule or (2) to reclaim state territory acquired through unjust military 
occupation. Remedial secession would establish a third exception, where, as a last resort, a group subject to 
serious and persistent internal injustices would be acknowledged by the international community to have the 
right to secede and form its own political unit. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 333, 335 (2004). 
 35 The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (the “Badinter Arbitration 
Commission”) was established by the Council of Ministers of the European Community in 1991 under Robert 
Badinter, President of the French Constitutional Court; its five-member Commission handed down fifteen 
opinions on legal questions raised by the impending break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
See generally Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-
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importantly, it provided time to nurture the doctrinal responses on the 
Responsibility to Protect and remedial secession.36 These doctrines emerged 
“hand in hand” out of Kosovo.37 But at what cost and of what consequence? 
This Article argues the sui generis circumstance conciliated Kosovo’s doctrinal 
antagonisms by avoiding the “terrible either-or’s” of legitimacy or legality.38 
This conciliation did not eradicate the contradictions—it repressed them. 
International legal scholars, and most certainly Western foreign policy-makers, 
coalesced around the sui generis designation because it seemingly avoided the 
establishment of a precedent; but that act may have boomeranged. It may have 
created its own precedent in terms of circumventing the Charter system while 
rhetorically attempting to uphold it.39 Taking a card from the West’s playbook, 
Russia now has exploited the legal rhetoric of Kosovo, “cleverly embraced” 
the language of international law, and dangerously shifted the delicate balance 
between territorial integrity and self-determination toward the latter through its 
2014 annexation of Crimea.40 How many more cards will Russia play? 
Revanchist concerns, some cloaked in the guise of self-determination, have 
spread across Europe: from the Transnistria statelet in Moldova on the 
underbelly of the former Soviet Union,41 in the technically-Azerbaijani but 
 
Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 178 (1992) (discussing the formation of the committee and its 
opinions relating to the future of self-determination). The Committee established the right of Yugoslavia’s six 
republics (as recognized under the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution) to gain independence (Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) but claimed this right did not extend to 
national minorities or to the two autonomous Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. See id. at 182–84 
(Opinions No. 1 and No. 2). For discussions on the Badinter Arbitration Commission’s preclusion of secession 
options for autonomous regions, see SUZANNE N. LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED 
WORLD: THE ROLE OF UTI POSSIDETIS 237 (2002); James Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-
Determination, supra note 8, at 842–43.  
 36 See EIKI BERG & MARTIN MOLDER, JANUS-FACED HUMAN SECURITY DISCOURSE: EU AND RUSSIA 
TALKING PAST EACH OTHER IN KOSOVO AND THE CAUCUS? 12 (2012). 
 37 JAMES KER-LINDSAY, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF COUNTER SECESSION: PREVENTING THE RECOGNITION 
OF CONTESTED STATES 37 (2012) (noting that the Responsibility to Protect emerged “hand in hand” with the 
notion of remedial secession) [hereinafter KER-LINDSAY, COUNTER SECESSION]. 
 38 Leszek Kolakowski, In Praise of Inconsistency, DISSENT MAG., Apr. 1964, at 201, 204. 
 39 See Theodore Christakis, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law Something to 
Say About Secession, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 73, 80 nn.35, 81 (2011) (noting the constancy of claims classifying 
Kosovo as sui generis); Transcript. Prepared Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL. (June 28, 1999), http://www.cfr.org/nato/prepared-remarks-secretary-state-madeleine-k-
albright/p3189 (cautioning against concluding that Kosovo serves as a precedent).  
 40 William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, 56 SURVIVAL 65, 68 (2014). 
 41 Will Englund, Transnistria, the Breakaway Region of Moldova, Could be Russia’s Next Target, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/transnistria-the-breakaway-region-of-
moldova-could-be-russias-next-target/2014/03/24/c68c50a4-be46-4042-a192-6813e93380bc_story.html; 
David Kashi, Could Moldova Be the Next Crimea? Ethnic Russians in Transnistria Call on Moscow for 
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ethnically-Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh situated between the 
Caspian and Black Seas,42 in the Lugansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine, 
where Russia and Ukraine stand at the brink of open war,43 in the heart of 
central Europe,44 among the Baltic countries,45 in Finland,46 and throughout 
Scandinavia47—across the fourteen borderland states of the former USSR now 
populated by twenty-five million Russians relocated to territories newly 
created following the Soviet collapse of 199148—irredentist sentiment stoked 
by the Russian diaspora present antagonistic opportunities for aggression.49 
How many coming European conflicts will be draped in the name of the sui 
generis circumstance? 
This Article assesses the lessons of Kosovo through the prism of this 
exceptional derogation from the Charter system and the challenges presented 
by the desire to avoid a precedent. Mindful of the widening of international 
 
Accession, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/could-moldova-be-next-crimea-ethnic-
russians-transnistria-call-moscow-accession-1562140. 
 42 See MICHAL LEBDUŠKA & VÁCLAV LÍDL, ASS’N FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: THE 
NEXT FIVE YEARS BETWEEN BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW 7 (2014) (discussing the urgency of a solution to 
Nagorno-Karabakh given Russia’s annexation of Crimea); Amit K. Chhabra, Superpower Responsibility for 
State Recognition: Charting a Course for Nagorno-Karabakh, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 125, 130–31 (2013). See 
generally HEIKO KRÜGER, THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1–24 (2010) (discussing 
the historical conflict regarding Nagorno-Karabakh’s territorial status). 
 43 Lizzie Dearden, Ukraine Crisis: Separatist Leaders Elected in Donetsk and Luhansk in ‘sham’ Vote, 
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-separatist-
leaders-elected-in-donetsk-and-luhansk-in-sham-vote-9837474.html; Ukraine Conflict: Battles Rage in 
Donetsk and Luhansk, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30878406. 
 44 Rick Lyman, Poles Steel for Battle, Fearing Russia Will March on Them Next, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/world/europe/poland-steels-for-battle-seeing-echoes-of-cold-war-
in-ukraine-crisis.html?_r=0.  
 45 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Putin Could Attack Baltic States Warns Former NATO Chief, TELEGRAPH 
(Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11393707/Putin-could-attack-
Baltic-states-warns-former-Nato-chief.html (quoting former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen as saying there is a “high probability” that Russian President Vladimir Putin will intervene in 
Estonia or Latvia where large Russian minority populations reside to test NATO resolve). 
 46 Adam Withnall, Vladimir Putin ‘wants to regain Finland’ for Russia, Adviser Says, INDEPENDENT 
(Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/vladimir-putin-wants-to-regain-finland-
for-russia-adviser-says-9224273.html (quoting President Putin’s former personal representative to the G8, 
Andrej Illarionov); Griff Witte, Finland Feeling Vulnerable Amid Russian Provocations, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/finland-feeling-vulnerable-amid-russian-
provocations/2014/11/23/defc5a90-69b2-11e4-bafd-6598192a448d_story.html (noting that there is growing 
alarm surrounding Russian invasion by former Finnish defense and parliamentary leaders).  
 47 Andrew A. Michta, Putin Targets the Scandinavians, AM. INT. (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.the-
american-interest.com/2014/11/17/putin-targets-the-scandinavians/. 
 48 Timothy Heleniak, Migration Dilemmas Haunt Post-Soviet Russia, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Oct. 1, 
2002), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-dilemmas-haunt-post-soviet-russia. 
 49 Witte, supra note 46. 
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law in directions suggested by the already voluminous literature on the 
Responsibility to Protect50 and the less well received idea of remedial 
secession,51 this Article construes the sui generis assertion as an invitation to 
anomie—the breakdown of structural integrity through normless “lack of 
regulation”52—more as a theoretical patch to mask tensions within the Charter 
system rather than as a proper platform to develop international law 
progressively through these doctrinal additives. 
To address this issue, this Article will proceed as follows: Part I will situate 
the concept of the sui generis claim within the context of international law. 
Part II, borrowing from the teachings of critical sociology, will address the 
theoretical deficiency (gap) in the U.N. Charter system that stimulates 
doctrinal appeals to the sui generis claim. Part III will highlight the external 
and internal tensions caused by NATO’s 1999 bombardment of Kosovo and 
Kosovo’s 2008 Declaration of Independence from Serbia. Part IV will address 
the “double bind” created by juridical and doctrinal attempts to conform the 
aforementioned problems of Kosovo to international law. Part V will discuss 
the troubling consequence of international law’s overworking of the sui 
generis concept: Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Article will conclude 
with a discussion of the doctrinal backsliding of the two doctrines that 
developed hand-in-hand with Kosovo: the Responsibility to Protect and 
remedial secession. 
 
 50 See generally Rossi, The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 27 (discussing the voluminous literature 
on the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect).  
 51 BUCHANAN, supra note 34; Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack 
of) Practice, 6 ST. ANTONY’S INT’L REV. 37, 56 (2010). Written and oral proceedings before the International 
Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo record a sharp division among states registering an opinio 
juris—states identified mostly as European. Of the thirty-five submissions, Albania, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, and ICJ Judges Cançado 
Trindade and Yusuf, supported remedial secession. Those opposed included: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, 
China, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Japan, Libya, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Slovakia, and ICJ Judge Koroma. See 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403 (July 22); James Summers, Kosovo: From Yugoslav Province to 
Disputed Independence, in KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT? THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY 
OPINION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 44 (James 
Summers ed., 2011) (“A greater participation from Asia and Africa would most likely increase opposition.”). 
 52 See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 258 (George Simpson ed., John A. Spaulding 
& George Simpson trans., 1951) (defining anomic suicide); ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN 
SOCIETY 291–328 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984) (discussing anomic, forced, and abnormal forms of the division of 
labor). 
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I. THE SUI GENERIS CLAIM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The sui generis claim is not prevalent in international law, but it arises 
often enough to make it a familiar legal concept, certainly not sui generis. 
Often, the term figures in calls for a new multi-lateral treaty.53 Here, it is 
presented as a means of extending or supplementing extant regimes that have 
not accounted for peculiarities or developments. The ice-bound features of the 
Arctic Ocean, for instance, make it a body of water distinct from the mostly 
blue-water regimes of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 
(UNCLOS);54 because UNLCOS addresses pelagic space of the cryosphere in 
but one article, Article 234,55 proposals periodically broach the subject of a 
special Arctic treaty to account for the region’s unique, ice-bound features.56 
Hybrid regime structures, such as the quasi-state status of the European Union 
(EU),57 the European Convention on Human Rights (which mixes international 
and domestic legal systems),58 and international criminal tribunals (involving 
common law accusatorial and civil law inquisitorial traditions—sometimes 
neither)59 have spawned debates about their sui generis status and the need for 
special conventional expression. Intellectual property law,60 the rights of 
 
 53 See James Henderson, Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties, 36 ALTA. L. REV. 47 (1997). 
 54 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 234, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
 55 Article 234 grants coastal states the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations 
for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution in ice-covered areas within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone where particularly severe climate conditions create exceptional hazards to navigation 
and where pollution could cause major harm to the ecological balance. Id.  
 56 See, e.g., LEONID TIMTCHENKO, QUO VADIS ARCTICUM?: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME OF THE 
ARCTIC AND TRENDS IN ITS DEVELOPMENT (1996); Oran R. Young, If an Arctic Ocean Treaty is Not the 
Solution, What is the Alternative?, 47 POLAR REC. 327 (2011).  
 57 Jakob C. Øhrgaard, International Relations or European Integration: Is the CFSP Sui Generis?, in 
RETHINKING EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY 26 (2004).  
 58 See, e.g., Andrew Drzemczewski, The Sui Generis Nature of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 29 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 54–63 (1980). But see Daniel Rietiker, The Principle of “Effectiveness” in the 
Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Its Different Dimensions and Its Consistency 
with Public International Law–No Need for the Concept of Treaty Sui Generis, 79 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 245–77 
(2010).  
 59 See generally Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 569–89 (2000). 
 60 See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copyright 
over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2559–72 (1994); John M. Griem Jr., 
Against a Sui Generis System of Intellectual Property for Computer Software, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 145 
(1993); Bonwoo Koo, Carol Nottenburg & Philip G. Pardey, Plants and Intellectual Property: An 
International Appraisal, SCIENCE 1295–97 (2004). 
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indigenous peoples,61 and the international law of trade62 comprise other areas 
that generate proposals for sui generis treatment. These proposals seem united 
in promoting a gap-filling application of the sui generis claim based on the 
insufficiency of existing law. Here, the sui generis claim approximates a 
praeter legem function, akin to Roman law’s development of the principle of 
equity (aequitas), by serving as a supplement to the law. In one interesting 
application, historical circumstances dating to Spanish colonial rule in the New 
World rendered the Pacific waters of the Gulf of Fonseca sui generis.63 Two 
international courts affirmed a condominium or shared sovereignty 
arrangement among El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the coparceners 
adjacent to Fonseca’s indented coastline.64 This lex specialis was applied not to 
supplement the law, but to retrospectively conform legal title to pre-existing 
factual circumstances.65 Here, the sui generis claim could be construed as 
unique but infra legem—within the law.66 
Kosovo’s sui generis circumstances presented different and problematic 
constructions. Both the bombing and the secession seemed strikingly against 
the law—contra legem.67 The challenge for advocates of its application has 
been to re-characterize it as somehow legally acceptable or tolerably outside 
the law (ultra vires).68 
 
 61 See, e.g., John Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It 
Make a Difference, 36 ALTA. L. REV. 9 (1997); James Henderson, Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties, 36 ALTA. 
L. REV. 46 (1997). 
 62 See, e.g., Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 969 (2006). 
 63 See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), Judgment, 1992 
I.C.J. Rep. 351, ¶ 412 (Sept. 11) (labeling the Gulf of Fonseca’s waters sui generis). 
 64 See El Salvador v. Nicaragua, CACJ Judgment of Mar. 9, 1917, in 11 AM. J. INT’L L. 674 (1917); El 
Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 432. 
 65 See generally Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.; Nicar. intervening), 
Summary of the Judgment (Sept. 11, 1992), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/75/6673.pdf. 
 66 This conclusion prompted a vigorous dissent by Judge Oda. For a sympathetic treatment of Judge 
Oda’s dissent, see generally Christopher R. Rossi, Jura Novit Curia? Condominium in the Gulf of Fonseca and 
the ‘Local Illusion’ of a Pluri-State Bay, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 793 (2015) [hereinafter Rossi, Jura Novit 
Curia].  
 67 See Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and 
Recognition, 12 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (2008), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/12/issue/2/kosovos-
declaration-independence-self-determination-secession-and [hereinafter Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence]; Patrick Wintour, MPs Say Kosovo Bombing Was Illegal But Necessary, GUARDIAN (June 6, 
2000), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2000/jun/07/balkans.politicalnews.  
 68 Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, supra note 67. 
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II. THE PROBLEM OF ANOMIE: BORROWINGS FROM CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 
To assess the sui generis claim, it is instructive to reflect on the 
fundamental tension of the Charter system—the inability of the Security 
Council to uphold reliably its jus ad bellum responsibilities under Chapter VII 
due to often-encountered deadlocks caused by the veto-wielding five 
permanent members.69 Balancing requirements of justice and order remains a 
central challenge and the pursuit of either goal often brings this collective 
security system into conflict.70 For insight into the management of this conflict, 
it is instructive to look to the field of critical sociology and, principally, the 
writings of Alvin Gouldner.71 His understanding of anomalies and gaps—how 
lacunae appear and are made to disappear—help explain the attraction of the 
sui generis exception in international law;72 his ideas provide context for the 
West’s difficulty in dealing legally and politically with Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea,73 an annexation that has allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin, 
through his discursive encounters with the media,74 to hoist the West by its 
own moralizing petard.75 
A. Lacunae and the Desire to Normalize 
Gouldner was interested in gaps or holes in the construction and 
maintenance of theory and structure.76 He investigated the role of 
 
 69 See Rossi, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 27, at 355. For an empirical study of the veto over a 
fifty-five year period, see Steve Chan, Power, Satisfaction and Popularity: A Poisson Analysis of UN Security 
Council Vetoes, 38 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 339–59 (2003).  
 70 See generally ROBERT E. OSGOOD & ROBERT W. TUCKER, FORCE, ORDER AND JUSTICE (1967). 
 71 See generally ALVIN W. GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS: CONTRADICTIONS AND ANOMALIES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY (1980) [hereinafter GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS]. 
 72 See id.; Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, supra note 67. Gouldner commented that an 
anomaly or gap was defined by whether the observation conformed or departed from theoretical expectations. 
The secession of Kosovo was interpreted as sui generis, or a unique anomaly, for falling away from theoretical 
expectations for secession in international law. 
 73 See Burke-White, supra note 40, at 66 (arguing that Washington has been unable to fully counteract 
Moscow’s legal argument that its support for Crimea’s annexation is grounded in international law). 
 74 Steven Lee Myers, Putin, Flashing Disdain, Defends Action in Crimea, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2014), 
www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/world/europe/putin-flashing-disdain-defends-action-in-crimea.html?_r=0; 
Transcript: Putin Defends Russian Intervention in Ukraine, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2014), www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-defends-russian-intervention-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/9cadcd1a-a3 
a9-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html; Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, Address to State 
Duma Deputies, Federation Council Members, Heads of Russian Regions and Civil Society Representatives in 
the Kremlin (Mar. 18, 2014), eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889#sel=53:1,53:6. 
 75 See Rossi, Ex Injuria, supra note 15, at 166. 
 76 This recurring theme first appeared in Gouldner’s treatment of the origins of Western social theory, 
ENTER PLATO (1965), which carried over into his critical examination of Marxism in THE COMING CRISIS OF 
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contradictions in the specific development of critical social theory.77 His 
interest centered on the challenges contradictions presented to a “common-
language-speaking community.”78 He focused on the intramural discord that 
beset the sociolect of post-World War II Marxism, with the praxis-oriented 
voluntarism of Young Hegelian (Critical) Marxists squaring off against the 
deterministic historical materialism of Engles’ (Scientific) legacy.79 That focus 
is of no interest here,80 but Gouldner’s insights on contradictions inform the 
community of scholars who speak the evolving legalect of international 
humanitarian law and state creation/secession.81 
Gouldner sensed the strong desire among scholars to “normalize theory”—
to render observations consistent with expectations,82 or to “interpret[] 
ambiguous outcomes in conformity with their wishes and needs”83—as a 
means of reducing dissonance, contradictions, and anomalies.84 He criticized 
classically construed notions of “objectivity,” which bore the imprint of Max 
Weber’s powerful emphasis on “value free” epistemology85—the basis of 
Weber’s admiration of the “logical formal rationality” of Western law.86 
 
WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970), and matured through his three volume investigation of the “dark side of the 
dialectic”: THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY: THE ORIGINS, GRAMMAR AND FUTURE OF 
IDEOLOGY (1976); THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW CLASS (1979); and THE TWO 
MARXISMS: CONTRADICTIONS AND ANOMALIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY (1982). 
 77 See GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS, supra note 71, at 11–12, 14, 16. 
 78 Id. at 165. 
 79 Id. at 15–16. 
 80 However, the influence of Critical Marxism had a profound effect on the praxis-oriented Frankfurt 
School; its informal birth in the late 1970s spawned a major attack against the formalistic structures of 
liberalism and law that directly gave birth to the Critical Legal Studies movement. See CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSI, 
EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGAL REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DECISIONMAKING 14 
(1993) [hereinafter ROSSI, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
 81 See GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS, supra note 71, at 11–12, 26, 28–29. 
 82 See id. at 16–18. Michel Foucault’s interest in normalization is more fashionable in critical social and 
international relations circles; his focus on normalization in relation to power and knowledge addresses how 
structures (for instance, the Panopticon) establish a system of discipline that conforms behavior to an ideal. See 
generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977). Gouldner’s 
understanding of normalization focuses on tensions caused by theoretical weaknesses, making his 
contributions important in relation to considerations of the sui generis exception.  
 83 Alvin W. Gouldner, The Dark Side of the Dialectic: Toward a New Objectivity, 46 SOC. INQUIRY 3, 3 
(1975) [hereinafter Gouldner, The Dark Side of the Dialectic]. 
 84 See id. at 4. 
 85 See id. at 3 (arguing that rational frameworks about the social world suppose them to have been 
produced in accordance with justified criteria and methods). 
 86 Weber’s interest in the rule-oriented rationality of Western jurisprudence, i.e., his formulation of the 
sociology of Western legal thought, derives from his massive three-volume study (especially Volume 2, pages 
641–901) entitled, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rhenstin ed., Edward Shils trans., 1984). For a 
discussion of logical formal rationality, see ROSSI, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 80, at 53. 
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Dilemmas, paradoxes, and antinomies expressed problems posed by systemic 
contradiction—internal theoretical contradictions “in which a system, at any 
concrete level, is blocked/inhibited from conforming with one system rule . . . 
because it is performing in accordance with another system rule.”87 The 
Kosovo bombardment and later its secession challenged the theoretical 
integrity of international law at concrete levels.88 The systemic rules in support 
of legitimacy inhibited adherence to the rules of legality and vice-versa, first in 
regard to the bombing campaign, second in regard to secession/self-
determination.89 Reconciling (“normalizing”) these tensions fomented 
doctrinal confusion and a sense that something was internally wrong with the 
Charter paradigm.90 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
consciously acknowledged the need to close this gap91 as legal scholars 
struggled to “normalize” the dissonance through the articulation of a 
theoretical fix, which took the patchwork form of the unique exception.92 
B. External and Internal Contradictions and the Pathological Problem of 
Anomie 
To Gouldner, contradictions constrain the development of theory in 
important ways. They force a dichotomy by “provid[ing] satisfaction of one 
alternative only”; they reduce the desirability of any outcome; and they inhibit 
compromise because they mandate a choice between outcomes.93 Gouldner 
noted that contradictions could be external or internal to theory.94 External 
contradictions generate polemics, which contribute to theoretical boundary 
formation and “are identity-defining for a theory.”95 For instance, developing 
 
See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s 
Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 
1031–76 (2003). 
 87 GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS, supra note 71, at 169–70. 
 88 See David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 129, 130–
31 (2001); Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, supra note 67. 
 89 See Wippman, supra note 88, at 131–32; see also Dan Bilefsky, World Court Rules Kosovo 
Declaration Was Legal, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/world/europe/23 
kosovo.html. 
 90 See Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, supra note 67; see also Claudia Parsons, UN 
Security Council Fails to Bridge Gaps on Kosovo, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSN19619120._CH_.2400. 
 91 See KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. 
 92 See infra notes 117–19; infra notes 122–41 and accompanying text. 
 93 GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS, supra note 71, at 169. 
 94 See id.  
 95 Id. at 16. 
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world approaches to international law generally emphasize a circumscribed 
right of self-determination in the post-colonial period to make amends for late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century imperial rule; the traditional 
Westphalian approach preferences the regard for state-centricity and territorial 
integrity.96 These bounded approaches demonstrate external orientations to 
international law’s history, construed polemically as counter-imperial history 
or as the Westphalian system’s “well-documented intimacy with the 
powerful.”97 
Internal contradictions, however, “constitute improprieties that generate 
powerful impulses to conceal them and to resist efforts to uncover or even 
discuss them.”98 Internal contradictions need to be explained away to prevent 
corroding normative and theoretical structure.99 But they are sometimes simply 
repressed or ignored, particularly when they inhibit change or demonstrate 
acute gaps in theoretical completeness.100 Was the sui generis claim 
constructed as a means of avoiding Charter contradictions? Left unattended, 
internal contradictions “proliferate pathologies of action,”101 leading to a 
paralysis of choice,102 ambivalence,103 or an awareness of theoretical crisis—
anomie.104 Moreover, a “double bind” may arise where internal contradictions 
can result from avoidance of the problem or the effort to conform to them 
through normalizing efforts.105 Deviance from one set of rules produces 
anomie by deteriorating normative structure precisely as a result of faithful 
 
 96 See A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and 
Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 133, 140; Marc Weller, The Sounds of Silence: 
Making Sense of the Supposed Gaps in the Kosovo Opinion, in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE KOSOVO 
ADVISORY OPINION 187, 196–99 (2015). 
 97 SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 1 (2012). 
 98 GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS, supra note 71, at 16. 
 99 Id. at 170. 
 100 Gouldner charges that the “textual skimpiness” of the Asiatic Mode of Production was left so 
underdeveloped in the body of Marx’s work because it so sharply contradicted Marx’s primary paradigm that 
all of history was a history of class struggle. Unable to address the contradiction, Marx repressed it. See id. at 
325–28. 
 101 Id. at 169. Pathologies of action is a concept found throughout the work of Durkheim; it occupies a 
significant place in modern sociological inquiry. See Jennifer M. Lehmann, The Question of Caste in Modern 
Society: Durkheim’s Contradictory Theories of Race, Class, and Sex, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 566 (1995); Frank W. 
Elwell, The Sociology of Emile Durkheim, EMILE DURKHEIM’S SOC., http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/users/ 
f/felwell/www/Theorists/Durkheim/index2.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2015). 
 102 GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS, supra note 71, at 69. 
 103 See id.  
 104 Id. at 170. 
 105 Id.  
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conformity to another set of rules.106 In each case, contradictions do not result 
from anomie, they produce anomie.107 The double bind of using the sui generis 
defense to avoid Charter contradictions did indeed produce a “pathological” 
problem of conforming the exceptional circumstance through normalizing 
efforts: the sui generis claim “was used as a legal argument in order to 
convince the international community that [Kosovo] is so unique [sic] that it is 
situated out of the realm of international law and cannot be considered in any 
way as a ‘precedent’ for future secessionist attempts.”108 As if situated in a 
“twilight zone,” normalizing the exceptional circumstance of Kosovo 
necessitated the conclusion “in the interest of [i]nternational stability, [that] 
international law does not apply any more.”109 Eric Posner noted this 
“exquisitely tortured” overworking of the sui generis justification: NATO’s 
bombing of Kosovo was tantamount to the admission “that we broke the law; 
we won’t do it again; and you better not, either.”110 And in the case of 
Kosovo’s unilateral break from Serbia, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
became ensnared in a “double bind” in its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo:111 the 
ICJ not only avoided the question put to it,112 accentuating a juridical sense of 
crisis through creation of a disguised non liquet, its attempt to 
conform/normalize Kosovo’s actions to Security Council Resolution 1244 also 
may have been so “parsimonious” and “sophistic” as to deprive its opinion of 
legal relevance.113 The Advisory Opinion may now serve as an unfortunate 
example of the Court’s own pathological paralysis of (in)decision.114 
The sui generis exception attempted to avoid the problem of Charter 
contradictions exposed by Kosovo.115 As a means of side-stepping the internal 
contradictions of the Charter system, the exceptional derogation avoided the 
paralysis of choosing between equally unappealing options and may have 
 
 106 See id.  
 107 Id.  
 108 Christakis, supra note 39, at 80–81 (emphasis added). 
 109 Id. at 81 (internal quotations omitted). 
 110 Eric Posner, The Kosovo Precedent, ERIC POSNER (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.ericposner.com/the-
kosovo-precedent (referencing comments defending NATO made by U.S. Acting Legal Adviser Michael 
Matheson). 
 111 See generally Accordance with the International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403 (July 22). 
 112 Anne Peters, Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 95, 95–96 
(2011). 
 113 Id. at 108. 
 114 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1999). 
 115 See Christakis, supra note 39, at 80–81; Siegfried Schieder, Pragmatism as a Path Towards a 
Discursive and Open Theory of International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 663, 664 (2000).  
ROSSI GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/15/2016 9:39 AM 
2016] IMPALED ON MORTON’S FORK 369 
helped develop the Responsibility to Protect and remedial secession 
doctrines.116 These doctrines not only grew beyond their sui generis conditions 
precedent, giving rise to enthusiastic assessments about new directions in 
international law,117 they also eclipsed discussion of the underpinning and 
dissonant theoretical weakness (anomie) remaining within the Charter system, 
a weakness that now has been exploited by Russia in support of its actions in 
Crimea.118 This deteriorating normative structure, overtaken by the enthusiasm 
for doctrinal change, is not an optimal basis on which to construct new 
directions for the Charter system as suggested by the Responsibility to Protect 
and remedial secession doctrines.119 Gaps at the foundation of the Charter 
system, out of which these doctrines arose, may now account for the doctrinal 
backsliding affecting both concepts.120 
III. THE DOCTRINAL MAKING OF THE SUI GENERIS EXCEPTION AND THE 
ATTEMPT TO NORMALIZE 
Discussions about the legality and legitimacy of the NATO bombardment 
evidenced an awareness of theoretical anomie, prompting attempts to reconcile 
tensions between the two.121 The Kosovo Commission, chaired by Richard 
Goldstone and Carl Tham, concluded the NATO campaign was “illegal, yet 
legitimate,” a conclusion that muted the significance of wrongfulness central to 
the ex injuria principle.122 Martti Koskenniemi argued: “NATO was either 
entitled to bomb Serbia or it was not. Tertium non datur.”123 Society contained 
no dark corner exempt from international law’s reach.124 Koskenniemi, 
 
 116 See Christakis, supra note 39, at 78 n.21; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: 
Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2002). See generally, 
Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 99, 99–110 (2002). 
 117 See Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Jus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 26, 29–30 (1999); 
JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN 
INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 336–37 (2010) (noting that the Responsibility to Protect could entail a fundamental 
conceptual shift in the role and powers of states). 
 118 Posner, supra note 110. 
 119 See Evans & Sahnoun, supra note 116, at 101; Peters, supra note 112, at 104–05. 
 120 See Evans & Sahnoun, supra note 116, at 100–01; Peters, supra note 112, at 107–08. 
 121 See Anthea Roberts, Legality vs. Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal But Justified?, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 179, 180 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008). 
 122 KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 1, at 186; see also Roberts, supra note 121, at 179–214. 
 123 Koskenniemi, supra note 116, at 161–62. Tertium non datur is the principle of mathematics and logic 
that holds a proposition is true or false with no middle option (also known as the principle of the excluded 
middle). See Abraham A. Fraenkel & Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Foundations of Set Theory, in STUDIES IN LOGIC 
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 215–38 (L.E.J. Brouwer et al. eds., 1958). 
 124 See Koskenniemi, supra note 116, at 162. 
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however, adopted the painfully ambivalent position that it “was both formally 
illegal and morally necessary.”125 He noted that for international lawyers 
“Kosovo has come to be a debate about . . . what we hold as normal and what 
exceptional.”126 Michael Reisman noted NATO’s action “did not accord with 
the designs of the Charter”—unless it could be construed as “the exceptio for 
that very small group of events that warrant or even require unilateral 
action . . . .”127 He predicted some international lawyers “will strain to weave 
strands [from various U.N. statements and resolutions] into a retrospective 
tapestry of authority.”128 Indeed, those strands would find future support in the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which retrospectively derived in part from 
Kosovo,129 and in Security Council Resolution 1244, which directly came 
about from Kosovo.130 
Bruno Simma acknowledged the illegal nature of the act and the “thin red 
line” separating NATO’s response from international legality.131 He suggested 
the gap could be minimized by characterizing the lessons of Kosovo as sui 
generis.132 Siegfried Schieder grouped him into the “rational ‘moralist[]’” 
camp, which (minimally),133 attempted to “wipe[] clean” the “venial [not 
mortal] sin” of Kosovo because of its “special marginal situation.”134 “It would 
become a mortal sin only if a precedent for the future were to be drawn from 
it.”135 Antonio Cassese, another “rational moralist,”136 also acknowledged the 
illegal act and its “exceptional character,” but he construed the gap between 
lawfulness and legitimacy as an existential gulf, not as a mere “thin red 
 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. 
 127 W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 860, 860 (1999). 
 128 Id.  
 129 See generally Evans & Sahnoun, supra note 116, at 99–110. 
 130 See Peters, supra note 112, at 100; Roberts, supra note 121, at 182. 
 131 Simma, supra note 114, at 22. 
 132 Id. at 14 (arguing that we should “regard the Kosovo crisis as a singular case”); see also Kosovo 
Declaration of Independence, REPUBLIC KOSOVO ASSEMBLY (Feb. 17, 2008), http://www.assembly-kosova. 
org/?cid=2,128,1635. 
 133 Schieder conceives of rational moralists as supporting minimalist and maximalist interpretations of 
international law. Minimalists interpret the Kosovo case as excusable as long as the U.N. system of collective 
security is not undermined. Maximalists take that approach one step further, criticizing the Charter’s ban on 
force in the sense that positivists regard it as the sole content of binding law to the exclusion of other norms 
(jus cogens, human rights) that are of importance to the community of states as a whole. Schieder, supra note 
115, at 692–93. 
 134 Id. at 692. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 692–93. 
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line.”137 Out of this flagrant breach of lex lata, the law as it is, he more broadly 
(maximally) suggested something new.138 Avoiding Posner’s “exquisitely 
tortured” critique, Cassese suggested ex injuria jus non oritur might be 
evolving into new customary law legitimizing the use of force absent Security 
Council authorization in stringently circumscribed instances:139 “[I]t would 
amount to an exception similar to that laid down in Article 51 of the Charter 
(self-defence).”140 Similarly, Thornberry noted an emerging trend: 
international law was “witnessing the rapid development of [a new] 
international law of humanitarian emergency, where the U.N. has primary, but 
not necessarily exclusive responsibilities”; where “no bright white line” of 
sovereignty could separate internal from international spheres and serve as an 
excuse for repression; where human rights could obtain the logical nostrum of 
community jurisdiction, making egregious violations a matter of international 
concern.141 
A. The Antinomies of NATO’s Bombardment of Kosovo 
“Faced with such antinomies” in reconciling Kosovo’s legality and 
legitimacy, Reisman wrote that no international lawyer could “look back at the 
incident without disquiet.”142 For too many analysts and commentators, “the 
Kosovo crisis offer[ed] a dubious precedent for future international 
interventions in Europe . . . .”143 NATO’s action stimulated as much concern 
about future self-deputized vigilantism as it did complaints about the veto-
addled Charter system and its critical inability to fulfill its collective security 
function.144 How best to close this gap and “ensure that NATO’s actions in 
Kosovo do not set a precedent for future interventions other than to assert it as 
an ‘exceptional response to violence’”?145 
From Kosovo’s mist a dynamic began to take shape. The Charter system 
could be saved from the contradictions presented by NATO’s bombardment by 
characterizing Kosovo as sui generis, or as the first step in international law’s 
 
 137 Cassese, supra note 117, at 23–24. 
 138 Id. at 30. 
 139 See id. at 29 (“[F]or the exclusive purpose of putting an end to large-scale atrocities.”). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Thornberry, supra note 17, at 56. 
 142 Reisman, supra note 127, at 860. 
 143 PAUL LATAWSKI & MARTIN A. SMITH, THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND THE EVOLUTION OF POST-COLD WAR 
EUROPEAN SECURITY 32 (2003). 
 144 Reisman, supra note 127, at 861–62. 
 145 LATAWSKI & SMITH, supra note 143, at 32–33. 
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creative ontology toward an emboldened international community response to 
internal violence. International legal scholars became important agents in 
developing this hybrid characterization. They upheld the Charter system’s 
emphasis on order and territorial imperative while crafting doctrinal space for 
limited exceptions. The sui generis appellation allowed conflicted international 
lawyers a means of managing lacunae in the Charter’s jus ad bellum structure 
without dealing with the tendentious problems of establishing a precedent. The 
doctrinal interplay nuanced an emerging idea to create remedial protection for 
populations suffering from internal abuse even before scholars, as agents, may 
have been fully aware of that goal.146 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in 
the footsteps of Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, co-chairs of the 
commission that forwarded the Responsibility to Protect doctrine,147 later 
would become the principal norm entrepreneur for this position.148 Support for 
the norm to create remedial protection for egregiously abused civilians opened 
the door to remedial secession as an adaptable right of subjugated peoples. 
B. Antinomies Redux: Kosovo’s Independence Declaration and Remedial 
Secession 
Kosovo’s mist would thicken before doctrinal characterizations could 
coalesce around establishing the Kosovo bombardment as a sui generis 
exception. In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, 
citing “years of strife and violence in Kosovo that disturbed the conscience of 
all civilized people.”149 The declaration reworked the right of self-
determination, an irreproachable right of an erga omens character,150 which 
historically serves as a narrow exception to international law’s support of the 
territorial integrity of states for the rights of peoples transitioning from colonial 
rule.151 The Kosovo declaration did not fit squarely in the colonial context but 
 
 146 For a discussion on constructivism, agency, and the formation of interactive social rules, see generally 
Vendulka Kubálková, Reconstructing the Discipline: Scholars as Agents, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A 
CONSTRUCTED WORLD 193–201 (Vendulka Kubálková et al. eds., 1998), and Nicholas Onuf, Constructivism: 
A User’s Manual in Societal Rules, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CONSTRUCTED WORLD 58–78 
(Vendulka Kubálková et al. eds., 1998). 
 147 See Evans & Sahnoun, supra note 116, at 99, 101. 
 148 See Rossi, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 27, at 369–70 nn.90–92 (noting Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon’s creation of a special advisor position for the Responsibility to Protect and issuance of six reports on 
the Responsibility to Protect since 2009). 
 149 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, supra note 133. 
 150 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30). 
 151 See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION, THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 7 (1978); John Dugard, 
The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, in 357 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (2011); 
see also G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
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drew support from an inverted or a contrario reading of the 1970 Declaration 
on Friendly Relations.152 The Safeguard Clause of the Declaration precluded 
the dismemberment of states “conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”153 The negative 
implication of this clause supports a right of remedial secession: “If the State 
does violate the rights of some of its peoples, then those people would have a 
claim to impair territorial integrity by secession.”154 
If this reading of the Safeguard Clause constituted an example of 
Reisman’s strained retrospective search for legal authority,155 Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999) and its annexes may have provided another.156 The 
European Union interpreted this Resolution as supporting a spirit of 
independence for Kosovo, or at least as not constraining or pre-determining the 
final status outcome for Kosovo.157 The General Assembly specifically 
requested advice from the ICJ on the question: “Is [Kosovo’s] unilateral 
 
(Dec. 14, 1960) (proclaiming the right of self-determination in the context of decolonization); G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), Declaration on Principles of international Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) (attaching self-
determination to ending colonialism); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression (Dec. 14. 1974) 
(exempting wars of self-determination against colonial and racist regimes from the definition of aggression); 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 154 (concluding that the people of Quebec do not 
qualify as colonial peoples). 
 152 Vidmar, supra note 51. 
 153 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 151. 
 154 Thomas W. Simon, Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, from Katanga to Kosovo, 
40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 105, 123 (2011) (noting, however, that the “saving clause [Safeguard Clause] 
seems to limit any possible entitlement to secede to racial and religious groups”). Support for the principle 
directly derives from the U.N. Charter art. 1(2). See Oliver Corten, Territorial Integrity Narrowly Interpreted: 
Reasserting the Classical Inter-State Paradigm of International Law, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 87, 91–92 (2011) 
(noting the a contrario implication of the Saving Clause). 
 155 Numerous states contested the a contrario significance of G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), arguing that the 
remedial secession thesis cannot be deduced from the resolution or from international practice. See Corten, 
supra note 154, at 92 n.30. 
 156 S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 7. Annexes 1 and 2(5) authorize the establishment of an interim 
“transitional” administration for Kosovo charged with “establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions” under which “the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial 
autonomy within” Yugoslavia. Id. 
 157 See Chris Borgen, International Law and Kosovo’s Independence: Assessing Resolution 1244, OPINIO 
JURIS (Feb. 19, 2008, 7:17 PM) [hereinafter Borgen, International Law and Kosovo’s Independence], http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2008/02/19/international-law-and-kosovo%E2%80%99s-independence-assessing-resolution-
1244/ (agreeing that the EU position “holds water”); see also Marcelo G. Kohen & Katherine Del Mar, The 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo and U.N.S.C.R. 1244 (1999): A Declaration of ‘Independence from International 
Law’?, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 109, 109–26 (2011). The EU’s interpretation was significant because the 
European Union took on an expanded role in the administration of Kosovo in 2008, with the devolution of 
most UNMIK operations and the establishment of the EU’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). See 
Summers, supra note 51, at 41–42.  
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declaration . . . in accordance with international law.”158 The ICJ provided its 
own inverted or a contrario response when it interpreted the General 
Assembly’s request as asking only for an assessment of whether the 
Declaration of Independence violated international law.159 It reasoned: 
The Court is not required by the question it has been asked to take a 
position on whether international law conferred a positive entitlement 
on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence or, a fortiori, on 
whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities 
situated within a State unilaterally to break away from it.160 
One wonders what new meaning the Court imparted to advisory opinions. In 
contentious cases, the presumption of jura novit curia reigns: “[t]he court 
knows the law,” which it may apply proprio motu (on its own motion) and ex 
officio (regardless of the legal arguments of the parties in dispute).161 The same 
maxim applies in advisory opinions, although they have no legal effect.162 But 
not to opine on the question presented negates even the reason for asking 
advice. It renders the process dilatory, or worse. Judge Bennouna claimed the 
Court trivialized the request, providing with its non-answer “a good reason 
why the Court should have refrained from acceding to the General Assembly’s 
request for an opinion in the first place.”163 Judge Simma declared the ICJ 
skirted the bounds of non liquet, an odious denial of justice caused when “a 
judicial institution [is] unable to pronounce itself on a point of law . . . .”164 
Judge Simma did not go so far as to claim the Court breached this prohibition, 
but other interpretations of the problem of non liquet note its disguised and 
informal contexts.165 Scholars roundly derided the opinion for its 
circumvention of the real issue: remedial secession.166 
 
 158 Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 1 (July 22). 
 159 Id. ¶ 56; see also id. ¶ 1 (declaration by Simma, J.). 
 160 Id. ¶ 56. 
 161 See Rossi, Jura Novit Curia, supra note 66.  
 162 See Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=2 (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2015) (summarizing that “advisory opinions have no binding effect”). 
 163 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 158, ¶¶ 67, 69 (dissenting opinion by Bennouna, J.). 
 164 Id. ¶ 9 (declaration by Simma, J.). 
 165 See generally LUCIEN SIORAT, LE PROBLEME DES LACUNES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL: CONTRIBUTION 
A L’ÉTUDES DES SOURCES DU DROIT ET DE LA FONCTION JUDICIAIRE (1958) (discussing types of non liquet due 
to the obscurity, logical or social insufficiency, silence, or absence of law). The doctrine finds principal 
explication in field of judicial settlement of disputes, where its application is prohibited as a general principle 
of international law. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
51–84 (1933) (noting the peculiarities of non liquet and “genuine” and “spurious” applications by judges and 
states). For classical treatments exploring the concept outside the judicial realm, see Hersch Lauterpacht, Some 
Observations on the Prohibition of Non Liquet and the Completeness of the Legal Order, in SYMBOLAE 
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The ICJ then examined Security Council Resolution 1244 in light of 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence.167 It avoided discussion of whether 
Security Council Resolution 1244 created a sui generis circumstance, but it did 
label it “an exceptional measure”168 and observed that because Security 
Council Resolution 1244 referenced the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and 
because it also established an international administration for Kosovo, it 
created a specialized law, or lex specialis.169 Having arrived at this conclusion, 
the only question it needed to determine—a question it was not asked—was 
“whether the declaration of independence violated either general international 
law or the lex specialis created by Security Council Resolution 1244”?170 
The Court advised that Kosovo’s declaration did not violate general 
international law—opining that no such prohibition existed.171 But the lex 
specialis created by Security Council Resolution 1244, which led to UNMIK’s 
interim administration of Kosovo, presented a more involved consideration: 
did the lex specialis enjoin unilateral actions by both Serbia and Kosovo?172 
Did it introduce “a specific prohibition on issuing a declaration of 
independence”?173 This question again touched on the thorny problem of 
remedial secession, where the Court might have been required “to opine on 
 
VERZIJL 196–221 (J.H.W. Verzijl & F.M. van Asbeck eds., 1958) (discussing treatments of non liquet in 
arbitration, by the International Law Commission, and in doctrine); W.M. Reisman, International Non-Liquet: 
Recrudescence and Transformation, 3 INT’L LAW. 770 (1969) (noting non liquet’s express or implied 
appearance in municipal legal systems); Julius Stone, Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International 
Community, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 124, 126 (1959) (noting non liquet’s apparent minuteness, suggesting not 
its triviality but its relation to the fundamental “sub-atomic” structure of law). 
 166 See, e.g., Timothy William Waters, Misplaced Boldness: The Avoidance of Substance in the 
International Court of Justice’s Kosovo Opinion, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 267 (2013). 
 167 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 158, ¶ 83. 
 168 Id. ¶ 97 (noting it was “aimed at addressing the crisis existing in that territory”). 
 169 See id. (noting that Security Council Resolution 1244, together with UNMIK regulation 1999/1 
(establishing civil and security presence) “had the effect of superseding the legal order in force at that time”). 
Lex specialis is one of three general techniques of rule interpretation (together with lex superior, the preference 
of rules deriving from one superior source, and lex posterior, the preference of rules promulgated later in 
time); it is employed to resolve conflicts of law and lays down the presumption that general rules yield to the 
application of more specific rules. See Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 
47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 273, 273 (1976).  
 170 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 158, ¶ 83.  
 171 The court advised “that general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of 
independence,” was not violated, and that the legal relevance of Security Council Resolution 1244 established 
a “Constitutional Framework” deriving from international law, functioning “as part of a specific legal order . . . 
which is applicable only in Kosovo . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 84, 88–89. The ICJ noted the Constitutional Framework was 
“still in force and applicable at the time of Kosovo’s declaration.” Id. ¶ 91. 
 172 See Corten, supra note 154, at 94. 
 173 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 158, ¶¶ 101, 111 (noting this question was a matter of 
controversy in the proceedings); see Summers, supra note 51, at 46–47.  
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whether a Security Council decision under Chapter VII is invalid if it infringes 
upon a right of self-determination, often viewed as a norm that has acquired 
the status of jus cogens.”174 
The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo recognized that Resolution 1244 “was 
mostly concerned with setting up an interim framework of self-
government”;175 and that its three distinct features were to (1) establish an 
international civil and security presence with full responsibility for 
governance; (2) implement an interim scheme for humanitarian administration; 
and (3) facilitate a negotiated solution for Kosovo’s future status.176 The Court 
stressed that Security Council Resolution 1244 was mindful but not dispositive 
of Kosovo’s final status process.177 And yet the language of the unilateral 
declaration (obviously akin to numerous other revolutionary decrees) was not 
intended to take effect within the legal order created for the interim self-
administration phase; its significance and effect would lie outside that order.178 
But the Court recognized that all matters relating to the external relations of 
Kosovo fell within the exclusive prerogative of the Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative for Kosovo,179 whose duties included supervising the lex 
specialis created by the Security Council for Kosovo’s administrative rule:180 
had the Special Representative considered Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence an act ultra vires, he would have been duty-bound to “take 
action.”181 But, in an act of “some significance,” he remained silent, 
“suggest[ing] he did not consider the declaration” as coming from within the 
established interim order, but from “outside the framework of the interim 
administration.”182 This reading of the Special Representative’s silence 
suggests the U.N.’s chief administrator in Kosovo lacked power to take action 
over an internal secession movement in a territory over which he had 
 
 174 See generally Sean Murphy, Reflections on the I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Interpreting 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), in THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE KOSOVO ADVISORY OPINION 
(Michael Wood & Marko Milanovic eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2015). 
 175 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 158, ¶ 104. 
 176 Id. ¶¶ 96–99 (discussing the three distinct features of Security Council Resolution 1244). 
 177 Id. ¶ 104. 
 178 See id. ¶ 105. 
 179 German diplomat Joachim Rücker served as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Kosovo between September 2006 and June 2008. See Curriculum Vitae Ambassador Dr. Joachim Ruecker, 
GERMAN PERMANENT MISSIONS GENEVA, http://www.genf.diplo.de/Vertretung/genf/en/01/botschafter-stv-
lebenslauf-en.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2015). 
 180 See Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 158, ¶ 106. 
 181 Id. ¶ 108. 
 182 See id. ¶¶ 108–09 (concluding that the authors of the declaration acted outside the framework of the 
interim administration). 
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prerogative power.183 This explanation exposed an internal contradiction 
created by the Security Council’s lex specialis, which the Advisory Opinion on 
Kosovo avoided, perhaps out of an interest in safeguarding its institutional 
integrity on the legality of remedial secession in relation to the right of self-
determination.184 Already the die may have been cast regarding Kosovo’s final 
status: a 2005 report submitted by the former Secretary-General’s Special 
Envoy in Kosovo, Kai Eide, convinced former Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
that “the time has come to move to the next phase of the political 
process,”185—the determination of the “highly sensitive political issue” of the 
future status of Kosovo.186 Eide’s successor, Martti Ahtisaari, reinforced the 
U.N.’s commitment of independence for Kosovo, sparking criticism that 
negotiations to reintegrate Kosovo into Serbia (albeit with a high degree of 
autonomy) were not brokered honestly,187 and by 2007, were not part of the 
U.N.’s plan.188 
Attempts to normalize the ICJ’s ambiguous conclusion on Kosovo’s 
independence made Security Council Resolution 1244 a source of authority for 
all sides189—a point facilitated by the ICJ’s conclusion that it “is at best 
ambiguous” on the question of a lex specialis prohibiting a unilateral 
 
 183 Russia vociferously attacked Rücker’s impartiality in his role as U.N. envoy. See Ioannis Michaletos, 
Debate in U.N. Council Between Russia-U.N. Envoy on Kosovo Status, SERBIANNA (Mar. 26, 2007), http:// 
serbianna.com/blogs/michaletos/archives/98 (criticizing Rücker for preaching for Kosovo’s independence); see 
also Edith Lederer, Churkin Lashes out at UN Kosovo Envoy, MOSCOW TIMES (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www. 
themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2007/3/article/churkin-lashes-out-at-un-kosovo-envoy/198279.html (citing 
critical comments by Russia’s U.N. ambassador). 
 184 Ieva Vezbergaite, Remedial Secession as an Exercise of the Right to Self-Determination of Peoples, 
(2011) (LL.M thesis, Central European University), www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/vezbergaite_ieva.pdf. 
 185 U.N. Secretary General, Letter Dated October 2005 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/635 (Oct. 7, 2005), http://www.unosek.org/docref/ 
KaiEidereport.pdf. 
 186 Id. at 18. 
 187 See Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination, supra note 8, at 845, 846 nn.28–29 
(criticizing Ahtisaari’s method of negotiations to load his argument with no alternative but statehood).  
 188 See id. at 846 (noting the Ahtisaari Plan discussions were aimed at achieving the “modalities” of 
statehood for Kosovo, not autonomy within Serbia). 
 189 Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, supra note 67, at 2 (“On balance, it appears the 
Resolution 1244 neither promotes nor prevents Kosovo’s secession.”); Steven E. Meyer, Security Council 
Resolution 1244–Everyone’s Favorite Crutch, TRANSCONFLICT (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.transconflict. 
com/2013/03/security-council-resolution-1244-everyones-favorite-crutch-113/ (cautioning that the resolution 
has become a bumper sticker used by all sides to justify their positions on Kosovo’s outcome); Murphy, supra 
note 174, at 2 (referring to Resolution 1244’s relation to Kosovo’s long-term fate “vague and under-
developed”). 
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declaration of independence.190 This ambiguity concealed the ICJ’s double 
bind: if it deviated from the normative structure of the Security Council’s lex 
specialis, its opinion could be construed as conforming remedial secession to 
an evolving set of rules pertaining to self-determination; but conforming 
secession to the rules on self-determination would undermine the authority of 
the Security Council and its exercise of Chapter VII responsibilities under 
Security Council Resolution 1244.191 Gouldner noted that internal 
contradictions present powerful impulses to conceal or ignore inconsistencies 
when presented with contradictory values.192 If these tensions were not ignored 
or repressed, they were not adroitly addressed.193 More sublime was the 
residual sense of anomie pertaining to the judicial treatment of remedial 
secession.194 
IV. THE DOUBLE BIND: CONFORMING KOSOVO TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
WHILE AVOIDING A PRECEDENT 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration eventually received strong support from the 
West,195 with the notable exceptions of Spain and Cyprus, which faced 
separatist concerns in Catalonia and the Basque Country; it also faced 
opposition in Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus.196 By November 2012, over 
ninety countries recognized Kosovo’s declaration, but there were notable 
 
 190 See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect to 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 118 (July 22).  
 191 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Meets in Emergency Session Following Kosovo’s 
Declaration of Independence, with Members Sharply Divided on Issue, U.N. Press Release SC/9252 (Feb. 18, 
2008), http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9252.doc.htm. 
 192 GOULDNER, THE TWO MARXISMS, supra note 71, at 16. 
 193 See id. at 13. 
 194 ALVIN GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 528 (1970) [hereinafter GOULDNER, 
WESTERN SOCIOLOGY].  
 195 Seventy U.N. member states recognized Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence of February 17, 2008, 
including twenty-two EU states. See Grace Bolton & Gezim Visoka, Recognizing Kosovo’s Independence: 
Remedial Secession or Earned Sovereignty?, at 2 (S.E. Eur. Studies at Oxford, Occasional Paper No. 11/10, 
2010), doras.dcu.ie/17126/1/RecognizingKosovosindependence.pdf. 
 196 See Christopher Borgen, 350. Is Kosovo a Precedent? Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict 
Resolution, GLOBAL EUR. PROGRAM, WILSON CTR. (July 7, 2011), www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/350-
kosovo-precedent-secession-self-determination-and-conflict-resolution [hereinafter Borgen, Is Kosovo a 
Precedent]; Spain Will Not Officially Recognize Kosovo, EURORESIDENTES (Feb. 18, 2008), news-
spain.euroresidentes.com/2008/02/spain-will-not-officially-recognise.html. Greece, Slovakia and Romania 
also steadfastly have refused to recognize Kosovo. See James Ker-Lindsay, Between “Pragmatism” and 
“Constitutionalism”: EU-Russian Dynamics and Differences During the Kosovo Status Process, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 175, 188 (2011) [hereinafter Ker-Lindsay, Between Pragmatism and Constitutionalism]. 
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objectors, including Russia, China, India, Brazil197 and four NATO 
members.198 Interestingly, support among the United States and leading EU 
members arose only after alternatives failed; evidence indicates policy-makers 
wanted to avoid at all cost an association between Kosovo’s secession and 
modifications to the right of self-determination.199 Once again, concerns arose 
about Kosovo’s precedential value, this time in terms of establishing secession 
as a remedy for chronic and egregious human rights violations.200 The Badinter 
Arbitration Commission, created in 1991 to advise on the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, had attached the right of independence to the six republics during 
Yugoslavia’s collapse, but not to autonomous regions such as the two Serbian 
provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.201 Appeals for Kosovo’s self-
determination had been parried during the Dayton peace process, which ended 
the Bosnian War in 1995.202 The principals again avoided discussing Kosovo’s 
right of constitutional self-determination during the 1997 Rambouillet Peace 
Conference203 and during the initial post-bombardment period of UNMIK’s 
administration of Kosovo as an autonomous region.204 Indeed, there did not 
 
 197 Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination, supra note 8, at 838. 
 198 The four NATO members were Spain, Turkey, Romania, and Slovakia.  
 199 See Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination, supra note 8, at 838. 
 200 Christopher J. Borgen, Introductory Note to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 47 I.L.M. 461 
(2008) [hereinafter Borgen, Introductory Note] (noting the United States and the United Kingdom have argued 
Kosovo’s secessionist claim is sui generis and of no precedential value); Borgen, Is Kosovo a Precedent, supra 
note 196, at 9. See generally Dugard, supra note 151. 
 201 See Pellet, supra note 35, at 182 (holding that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in the 
process of dissolution and “it is incumbent upon the Republics to settle such problems of state succession as 
may arise from this process”). In the concluding part of Opinion No. 8, the Badinter Arbitration Commission 
referenced Opinion No. 1 and found its dissolution “complete.” Jure Vidmar, Montenegro’s Path to 
Independence: A Study of Self-Determination, Statehood and Recognition, 3 HANSE L. REV. 73, 73 (2007). 
Opinions Nos. 4–7 held that Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia had met the requirements 
for recognition. Id. at 88. Serbia and Montenegro did not apply for recognition; instead, in 2003 they became 
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, disuniting in 2006. See id. at 73, 89. “Polities that did not have 
republic status in the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] were not recognized as having the right 
of self-determination.” Id. at 101. The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution defined Kosovo and Vojvodina as 
autonomous provinces. See Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination, supra note 8, at 
843. 
 202 See Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination, supra note 8, at 843. 
 203 See Marc Weller, The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 75 INT’L AFF. 211, 215 (2002) (noting the 
governments and international organizations at Rambouillet did not accept a right of statehood for Kosovo). 
The Rambouillet Agreement was a NATO-sponsored aborted peace agreement between the SFRY and 
representatives of Kosovar Albanians; it bore the name of Château Rambouillet, where talks commenced. Id. 
The Yugoslav government refused to sign the agreement, claiming it granted Kosovo too much autonomy. See 
Permanent Rep. of France to the United Nations, Letter Dated June 4, 1999 from the Permanent Rep. of France 
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc S/1999/648 (June 4, 1999) (introducing 
the “Rambouillet Accords: Interim agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo”). 
 204 See Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination, supra note 8, at 844. 
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appear initially to be any “appetite for an independent Kosovo even after the 
NATO intervention.”205 A leading legal authority on state secession, James 
Crawford, noted no international practice supporting “a unilateral right to 
secede based on a majority vote of the population of a sub-division or 
territory.”206 Accordingly, “self-determination within a state is to be achieved 
by participation in the political system of the state, on the basis of respect for 
its territorial integrity.”207 Critical as the West has been about Russia’s 
motivations and actions in Crimea, it was Russia’s legal position (motivations 
aside) in the U.N.-sponsored status process leading up to Kosovo’s unilateral 
Declaration of Independence that more accorded with traditional thinking on 
the right of secession under international law.208 But the subsequent collapse of 
the 2007 Ahtisaari Plan to establish supervised independence,209 followed by 
the similarly unsuccessful 2007 Troika negotiations between the United States, 
European Union, and Russia,210 tilted U.S. declaratory policy toward 
supporting Kosovo’s independence.211 As James Ker-Lindsay noted, the 
challenge became how to accomplish Kosovo’s statehood without upsetting 
established principles of international law or sowing tendentious seeds of 
secession among Chechens, Kurds in Iraq, Turkish Cypriots, Tamils in Sri 
Lanka, Serbs in the tenuously connected Republika Srpska, or in what is left of 
Serbian ancestral homes in Croatia’s Krajina region.212 From Katanga to 
Kosovo, past and present remedial secession grievances threatened to 
 
 205 Id. at 847.  
 206 James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession: Report to 
Government of Canada Concerning Unilateral Secession by Quebec, TAMILNATION.ORG (Feb. 19, 1997), 
http://tamilnation.co/selfdetermination/97crawford.htm. 
 207 Id.  
 208 See Ker-Lindsay, Between Pragmatism and Constitutionalism, supra note 196, at 176. 
 209 The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the Ahtisaari Plan) was a failed 2007 
settlement proposal between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated 
Mar. 26, 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc 
S/2007/168/Add.1 (Mar. 26, 2007). It was designed to supersede Security Council Resolution 1244, which 
created the interim administration for Kosovo following NATO’s bombing campaign. Id. It was developed and 
submitted to the U.N. Security Council by U.N. Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. See GERARD M. GALLUCCI, 
TRANSCONFLICT, THE AHTISAARI PLAN AND NORTH KOSOVO 4–5 (Nov. 2011), http://www.transconflict.com/ 
10/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/PolicyPaper_AhtisaariPlanNorthKosovo.pdf; Bureau of European & Eurasian 
Affairs, Summary of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Jan. 
20, 2009), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/101244.htm. 
 210 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated Dec. 10, 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/723 (Dec. 10, 2007) (introducing with enclosure the 
Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo). 
 211 Ian Traynor, Bush Insists Kosovo Must Be Independent and Receives Hero’s Welcome in Albania, 
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2007, 10:16 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/11/balkans.usa. 
 212 See Ker-Lindsay, Between Pragmatism and Constitutionalism, supra note 8, at 838–48. 
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appear.213 Shortly thereafter, the United States would support the break-up of 
Sudan and the creation of South Sudan in 2011214—a secession that almost 
immediately devolved into chaos.215 That case was controlled by a referendum 
negotiated within the political order, as part of a six-year interim 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement,216 making this case truly more of an 
exception than a precedent.217 Previously, the independence of Eritrea from 
Ethiopia (1993) and East Timor (Timor-Leste) from Indonesia (2002) “did 
little to challenge the accepted norms of state formation” because both were 
granted independence by the parent states, which themselves had gained 
formal control through suspect means.218 Rampant inter-communal violence in 
Iraq prompted proposals in 2006 to divide up the land into Kurdish, Sunni, and 
Shiite autonomous regions.219 Those proposals never gained acceptance or de 
jure recognition, although, ironically, as of early 2016, tri-partition may come 
closest to describing the de facto situation in the “cradle of civilization.”220 
 
 213 See generally Simon, supra note 154. 
 214 See TED DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41900, THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN: OPPORTUNITIES 
AND CHALLENGES FOR AFRICA’S NEWEST COUNTRY 1 (2011) (noting U.S. support since the late 1980s and the 
Obama Administration’s FY2012 $518 million request for assistance).  
 215 See generally Alex de Waal, When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in 
South Sudan, 113 AFR. AFF. 347, 347–69 (2014) (discussing South Sudan’s ensuing civil war and the 2012 
shutdown of its oil industry). 
 216 See generally Agreement Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the People’s Liberation 
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) on Implementation Modalities of the Protocols 
and Agreements, Dec. 31, 2004, U.S. INST. PEACE, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/ 
collections/peace_agreements/implementation_coversheet.pdf. 
 217 See Terence McNamee, The First Crack in Africa’s Map? Secession and Self-Determination After 
South Sudan, at 7 (The Brenthurst Found., Discussion Paper, 2012), http://issat.dcaf.ch/index.php/fre/content/ 
download/6238/54041/file/Brenthurst%20paper%202012-01.pdf.  
 218 Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination, supra note 8, at 842 (noting that 
neither case could be regarded as a true case of unilateral or even contested secession because Eritrea and East 
Timor had been separate colonies prior to absorption by Ethiopia and Indonesia). 
 219 See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/opinion/01biden.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. (proposing a five-
point plan for maintaining a united Iraq through ethno-religious autonomous regions based on the federated 
solution for Bosnia established by the Dayton Accords); Michael O’Hanlon & Edward P. Joseph, If Iraq Must 
Be Divided, Here’s the Right Way to Do It, REUTERS (July 4, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2014/07/03/if-iraq-must-be-divided-heres-the-right-way-to-do-it/.  
 220 With northeast Iraq now controlled by Kurdish Peshmerga militias, the south controlled by Iranian-
backed Shiite militias, and the northwest controlled by the Sunni Islamic State caliphate (ISIS/Daesh), an 
argument could be made that the country (and more if east-central Syria is considered) has effectively been 
partitioned. 
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Kosovo was different. With Russia in the throes of post-Soviet stagnation, 
magnified by the 2008 global financial crisis,221 NATO confidently pursuing 
its “open door” policy with eastern Europe,222 and every political option 
expended for resolution of Kosovo’s relation to Serbia, all European roads to 
secession led to Kosovo. But again, what better way of avoiding Pandora’s box 
of expanded self-determination claims than to describe Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration as unique? Anticipating a problem (doubtless with the 
encouragement of Western authorities), the framers of Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence sought to avoid remedial secession’s metastasis by inserting in 
their constitutive document a clause declaring “that Kosovo is a special case 
arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for 
any other situation.”223 
To some observers, Kosovo represented an unartful dodge from the 
pathology of Charter tensions on territorial integrity and state creation. 
Construed ultimately as an opportunistic means for the West to eat its state 
secession cake and have it too—and to remove itself from Kosovo before 
becoming an occupying rather than liberating force224—it “has come to be seen 
as an unacceptable redefinition of international principles designed to extricate 
[the United States and leading EU members] from a ‘mess’ of their own 
making, while denying other peoples the right to apply the same principles 
elsewhere.”225 
 
 221 See JEFFREY MANKOFF, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 8, 16 
(2010) (discussing Russia’s deep economic crisis beginning in 2008 and western assertiveness); Clifford G. 
Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, Russia After the Global Financial Crisis, 51 J. EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 281, 
281 (2010). 
 222 At its Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Albania and Croatia were invited to join NATO. Its leadership 
agreed to invite the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to become a member once a mutually acceptable 
solution to its name could be reached with Greece. Ukraine and Georgia also were promised membership, 
followed by membership invitations to Montenegro in 2009 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2010. See 
Enlargement, NATO (Sept. 1, 2015, 3:56 PM), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm# 
(discussing NATO’s enlargement process). 
 223 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Kosovo 2008). 
 224 See Ker-Lindsay, Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination, supra note 8 at 854 (noting that 
NATO and the U.N. administration ran the risk of being seen as an occupying power in Kosovo). 
 225 Id. at 838. 
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V. ENTER CRIMEA 
Dogged concerns of an overworked reliance on the sui generis exception 
produced claims of hypocrisy.226 Special circumstances had been invoked 
before to justify Western actions in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Iraq 
(2003), and Libya (2011).227 Critics long have viewed these justifications as 
window-dressing for regime change228 or as “philanthropic imperialism.”229 
Russia’s response to Georgia’s 2008 attempt to reclaim the autonomous 
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia engendered similar criticisms of 
pretext,230 but that conclusion was muddled by an EU fact-finding report that 
Georgia actually started the war.231 
A sense of existential crisis, however, took hold in February-March 2014 
following the turbulent Maidan movement in Ukraine that ousted the pro-
Russian regime.232 In response, the eastern region of Crimea broke away from 
Ukraine, declared independence, and through a widely-viewed sham 
referendum,233 reconstituted itself as an independent state only long enough to 
accede to a treaty allowing absorption by Russia.234 President Putin made 
repeated reference to the “well-known Kosovo precedent—a precedent our 
 
 226 See generally Ariel Zellman, Georgia: Territorial Integrity of Political Hypocrisy, ARIEL ZELLMAN 
RES. PUBS. INFO. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2008, 5:24 PM), https://arielzellman.wordpress.com/2008/08/26/ 
georgiaterritorial-integrity-or-political-hypocrisy/. 
 227 Posner, supra note 110. 
 228 See Xymena Kurowska, Multipolarity as Resistance to Liberal Norms: Russia’s Position on 
Responsibility to Protect, 14 CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEV. 489, 497 (2014); Richard Falk, Libya After 
Qaddafi, NATION (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/164221/libya-after-qaddafi#. 
 229 Alex de Waal, No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention, HARV. INT’L REV.: BLOG (Mar. 21, 
2007), http://hir.harvard.edu/no-such-thing-as-humanitarian-intervention/. 
 230 See Gareth Evans, Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 AMSTERDAM L.F. 25, 25–26 
(2009) (discussing inappropriate invocation by Russia of the Responsibility to Protect). 
 231 A fact-finding report commissioned by the European Union (the Tagliavini Commission Report), the 
first of its kind in EU history, found that Georgia started the five-day war following a long period of 
provocations. The conflict was limited to the Caucus region and described as “a combined inter-state and 
intrastate-conflict, opposing Georgian and Russian forces at one level of confrontation as well as South 
Ossetians together with Abkhaz fighters and the Georgians at another.” INDEP. INT’L FACT-FINDING MISSION 
ON THE CONFLICT IN GEOR., REPORT: VOLUME 1, at 5 (Sept. 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/ 
30_09_09_iiffmgc_report.pdf; see also Charles King, The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the 
Georgia Crisis, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 2, 11 (“[W]hat the West has failed to grasp is that many of 
the region’s inhabitants view the war of August 2008 as a justified intervention rather than a brazen attempt to 
resurrect a malevolent empire.”). 
 232 See Martin Winiecki, Ukraine: Torn Between Russia and the West, TERRA NOVA VOICE (Mar. 16, 
2014), http://terranovavoice.tamera.org/2014/03/is-there-a-third-way-for-ukraine/1608. 
 233 See G.A. Res. 68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014). 
 234 See Denver Nicks, Crimea Signs Treaty to Join Russia, TIME (Mar. 18, 2014), http://time.com/28443/ 
putin-paves-way-for-crimea-annexation/. 
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western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation.”235 
Likening Crimea’s unilateral separation from Ukraine with Kosovo’s split 
from Serbia, President Putin dismissed the claim that Kosovo was a special 
case, saying “[w]hat makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues?”236 
Some scholars also found the cases of Kosovo and Crimea too close for 
legal comfort,237 with Kosovo establishing a legal precedent for Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea.238 How could the sui generis circumstance of Kosovo 
be presented as an act infra legem (within the law) or praeter legem (as a 
supplement to the law) when, by definition, its unique classification held it 
outside the application of international law, making it either contra legem (in 
opposition to the law), or, possibly more charitably, ultra vires (beyond legal 
authority)?239 Several scholars agree that even if Kosovo did not create a 
precedent, stricto sensu, it serves as a dangerous complication.240 John Dugard 
thought it naïve that Kosovo would be accepted as a sui generis 
circumstance;241 the only surprise was how quickly it was invoked as precedent 
by Russia in respect of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.242 Vaughn Lowe 
forewarned that if NATO labeled the Kosovo campaign as an action sui 
generis, “it will surely come to be regarded . . . as a precedent.”243 Many years 
before, in view of NATO’s bombing campaign, Michael Mandelbaum 
predicted the boomerang effect of the sui generis claim, arguing that it would 
one day return to give Russia “the right to intervene in Ukraine” on behalf of 
 
 235 Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Fed’n, Address on State Duma Deputies, Federation Council 
Members, Heads of Russian Regions and Civil Society Representatives in the Kremlin (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/20603. 
 236 Id. 
 237 See Dugard, supra note 151, at 211 (arguing that Kosovo, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, will 
be invoked as justification for recognition by secessionist movements in non-colonial situations); Marko 
Milanovic, Crimea, Kosovo, Hobgoblins and Hypocrisy, EJIL: TALK! BLOG (Mar. 20, 2014), www.ejiltalk. 
org/crimea-kosovo-hobgoblins-and-hypocrisy; see also Simon Tisdall, Opinion, Obama Can’t Have it Both 
Ways on Crimea, CNN (Mar. 18, 2014), www.cnn.com/2014/03/17/opinion/crimea-vote-putin-obama/. 
 238 See generally Posner, supra note 110. 
 239 Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World, 25 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 293, 301 (2011). 
 240 See RENAUD FRANCOIS, EUROPEAN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE & SEC. CTR. [ESISC], INDEPENDENCE 
OF KOSOVO: DOES IT SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT? 6 (Feb. 28, 2008); see also Sebastian Schäffer, 
Comment, The Kosovo Precedent—Directly Applicable to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 3 CAUCASIAN REV. 
INT’L AFF. 108, 110 (2009). 
 241 Dugard, supra note 151, at 212–13. 
 242 Id. at 213. 
 243 Vaughan Lowe, International Legal Issues Arising in the Kosovo Crisis, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 934, 
939 (2000). 
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mistreated ethnic Russians.244 Pleading before the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion 
on Kosovo, Finland’s legal representative hinted at the slippery slope of the sui 
generis claim. She said every unilateral secession movement derives “from a 
domestic illegality,” or an act ultra vires;245 secession movements are absurdly 
sui generis, and that “[f]or every State, its statehood is sui generis, and 
dependent on its own history and power, not on the discretion of others.”246 
Those who attack the sui generis claim appear to deny that “[a] State is a State 
because it is special, not because it has come about by some procedural routine 
or some mechanical criterion.”247 “Statehood is not a gift that is mercifully 
given by others”;248 it does not come about by procedural routine, as if 
“distributing parking tickets.”249 As if to suggest there is no peer review system 
for membership into the club of statehood, she argued, “[statehood] is simply a 
political fact.”250 
Russia’s actions in defense of Ukraine’s dismemberment “exploited the 
tension” between territorial acquisition by force and self-determination—
decidedly and dangerously in favor of the latter.251 Its justifications broadly 
incorporated the right of remedial secession, the protection of nationals, 
collective self-defense, historic title, humanitarian intervention, and the 
Responsibility to Protect.252 President Putin’s omnibus co-optation of this 
language of international law exposed doctrinal falsehoods of the sui generis 
claim.253 He failed, however, to address one decisive consideration: Russia’s 
 
 244 Michael Mandelbaum, A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 6 
(1999). If predictions are of value, Moldova may soon present Europe’s next secession crisis. Since 1992, the 
sliver of land east of the Dniester River and west of Ukraine—called Transnistria—has claimed autonomy 
from Moldova; its population of 500,000 consists largely of ethnic Russians and its economy is substantially 
supported by Russia. The enclave voted overwhelmingly for accession by Russia in 2006 but Moscow rejected 
the offer. For causes, context, and consequences of the Transnistria conflict, see generally MATTHEW 
ROJANSKY, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, PROSPECTS FOR UNFREEZING MOLDOVA’S FROZEN 
CONFLICT IN TRANSNISTRIA (June 14, 2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Rojansky_Transnistria_ 
Briefing.pdf. 
 245 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Request for Advisory Opinion, ¶ 9 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15726.pdf. 
 246 Id. ¶ 7. 
 247 See id. ¶ 8 (statement of Päivi Kaukorante, Republic of Finland Director General, Legal Service, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  
 248 Id. ¶ 7. 
 249 Id. ¶ 8. 
 250 Id. ¶ 9. 
 251 See Burke-White, supra note 40, at 65. 
 252 See Rossi, Ex Injuria, supra note 15, at 146–47 (citing President Putin’s multiple justifications). 
 253 See Burke-White, supra note 40, at 66 (discussing President Putin’s ability to “exploit the legal 
ambiguities” in international law). 
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threat and use of force prompted Crimea’s sham referendum, which tainted 
Crimea’s profession of self-rule and turned its accession to Russia into an 
example of flat-out annexation.254 
CONCLUSIONS: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK 
Political forensics experts already regard Crimea as a fait accompli—a 
failed example of rhetorical gamesmanship on the part of NATO expansion 
enthusiasts who proved unwilling in the clutch to support Ukraine as a 
strategic Western interest.255 But international legal doctrine is left to deal with 
two important consequences for the Charter’s jus ad bellum system: the 
Responsibility to Protect and remedial secession as a legitimate form of self-
determination.256 Both of these legacies of Kosovo’s sui generis status present 
challenges to the theoretical integrity of the Charter system.257 As some 
scholars suggest, they may represent next steps in the development of 
international law.258 A constructivist orientation underscores this possibility. 
Constructivists articulate the nuances, social processes, and informal richness 
of international law creation; they embrace formal and informal interactive 
pathways from norm emergence to acceptance.259 These pathways are central 
to shaping law and human conduct. Rules or laws are not simply given or 
mandated; they are formed through social interaction, through language, and 
through shared understandings. Outcomes are not predetermined, ordained, or 
even necessarily rationally pursued; they arise from social interaction which, in 
itself, may affect how actors view themselves.260 Lending (perhaps unintended) 
voice to constructivist theory, Antonio Cassese noted “it is not an exceptional 
occurrence that new standards emerge as a result of a breach of lex lata.”261 
 
 254 See id. at 72 (discussing how the referendum ultimately was deemed to have no validity and 
“challenged the bedrock principle of nonintervention and the illegality of territorial acquisition through the use 
of force”). 
 255 See Jeffrey Mankoff, Russia’s Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine, 93 
FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2014, at 68 (2014) (conceding Russia may have won Crimea); John Mearsheimer, 
Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Decisions That Provoked Putin, 93 FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept.-Oct. 2014, at 79 (2014) (noting flaws in NATO’s Eastern expansion policy). 
 256 See Vidmar, supra note 51, at 38. 
 257 See Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The Responsibility to 
Protect, 2 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 121, 127–28 (2006). 
 258 See Cassese, supra note 117, at 29–30. 
 259 See Rossi, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 27, at 383 n.162. 
 260 See BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 118, at 13. 
 261 Cassese, supra note 117, at 30. 
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A constructivist dynamic may have been behind the rapid ascension of the 
doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect and the international traction it gained 
since its informal birth in 2001.262 The shared understanding of Kosovo’s final 
and independent status, which the United States, European Union, and U.N. 
Secretary-Generalship embraced, also may have supported the currency of 
remedial secession as an emerging variation of the right of self-
determination.263 But the rise of these ideas coincides with serious indications 
of doctrinal backsliding. The Responsibility to Protect remains very much a 
“work in progress” and remedial secession may be a more unstable and 
explosive doctrine than its Western advocates can abide.264 
The “astonishing” formal endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect in 
the 2005 World Outcome Document,265 and its widespread mention in the 
 
 262 See generally Rossi, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 27, at 383. The doctrine first found 
expression in the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). See 
generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS), THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (Dec. 2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. This report was published under 
the auspices of the Canadian International Development Research Center and was initiated by Canadian 
Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Id. at ix. 
 263 See Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, supra note 67. 
 264 Edward C. Luck, From Promise to Practice: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, in THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE PROMISE OF STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME 185 (Jared Genser & 
Irwin Colter eds., 2012). 
 265 G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, ¶¶ 138–39 (Sept. 16, 2005). The 
paragraphs read: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention 
of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept 
that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the UN in 
establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, 
in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war-crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration 
of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping 
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out. 
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language of global consensus, lead respected authorities to conclude it may 
“present[] a fundamental challenge to structural imperatives” and has the 
“potential for transformative change in the deep structures of sovereignty.”266 
Its inclusion in two paragraphs of the World Outcome Document projected 
expressions of “a tectonic shift . . . that will create a new legal and diplomatic 
discourse about member states’ obligations to their own people and to one 
another.”267 But “veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council . . 
. oppose the spread of enforcement authority beyond Chapter VII confines, 
notwithstanding the deadlock this force-centralization permits.”268 Many 
developing countries interpreted the doctrine as an invitation for meddling by 
more powerful states, but they “dropped their reservations . . . once the 
substantive norm was decoupled from specific operational criteria” and 
denuded of this most consequential component.269 This act indicates the 
Responsibility to Protect’s hidden doctrinal complexity based on non-
normalized fissures deep in the Charter system.270 The state-sponsored 
acceptance of the idea (as indicated by its inclusion in the World Summit 
Outcome Document) may represent a doctrinal variant of a distorted or 
misrepresented legal desire—a preference falsification—constructed to give 
rise to the illusion of its normative and popular appeal rather than the 
international community’s genuine desire to embrace it.271 Rather than 
developing from a sui generis circumstance into a center-stage additive to 
international legal doctrine, the doctrine is sliding back into a more aleatory 
world, “roundly discussed and studied, habitually and diplomatically invoked, 
institutionally referenced and applied, and yet treated by many with 
insouciance or as strange happenstance, like a loud meteor strike on a barren 
field.”272 Scholars have criticized it for its “shallow and dangerous 
moralisation” at the hands of powerful and privileged states;273 Secretary-
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General Ban Ki-moon overhauled the concept in 2008,274 presented it as a 
three-pillar approach to policy formation,275 and affirmed its coercive 
application only in accordance with Chapter VII provisions.276 This reworking 
seems to have downscaled the beyond-the-Charter-paradigm implications of 
the doctrine, turning it into a less inventive restatement of powers the Security 
Council always possessed.277 Facilitated by the sui generis circumstance of 
Kosovo, the Responsibility to Protect has been invoked in a variety of settings, 
but it  
failed its “first test case” in Darfur [2004], was unilaterally expanded 
[by NATO] beyond its Security Council mandate in Libya [2011] . . . 
fails to protect populations in South Sudan and Syria, and yet serves 
as a pretext for [Russia’s] . . . annexation of Crimea and aggressive 
sabre rattling toward eastern Ukraine . . . .278 
Remedial secession presents a firebomb for NATO, particularly if adapted 
to an evolving Kurdistan, which would involve portions of eastern Turkey, a 
key NATO ally.279 It presents woeful strategic implications for the West if it 
leads to a re-awakening of Achaemenidian interests in establishing a Greater 
Iran, or among Shiite militias in southern Iraq, which openly proclaim 
allegiance to Tehran.280 These prospects may seem inchoate, and comprise but 
two of many similar scenarios awaiting remediation in the form of state 
creation, but their consideration is borne out of dangerous tensions currently 
enveloping Europe.281 Shed imperfectly of its previous command economy and 
central planning system, Russia still embraces an amalgam of authoritarian 
interests, which seek out avenues of expression in co-opted international legal 
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form.282 The sui generis circumstance, cloaked in the evolving legalect of the 
Responsibility to Protect or remedial secession, provides an easier avenue for 
expression of international law’s anomie, given its systemic failure to deal with 
or normalize pathologies of actions caused by internal contradictions of the 
Charter system.283 International law should take more seriously the prospect 
that the sui generis circumstance is actually more common than unique; that 
over-worked attempts to defy its meaning and conform its application to short-
term interests may mark it as a troublesome signpost, not only as a dangerous 
precedent for “unique” circumstances to come, but of the internal 
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